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Competing for Contracts
Nonprofit Survival in an Age of Privatization
M. Bryna Sanger
New School University
Competition among private providers in the delivery of employment 
training services may not be new, but the entrance of a few national, 
for-profit corporations has recently begun to reshape the employment 
training industry following the lifting of restrictions provided for under 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Corporate players 
are changing the rules of the game in areas with a long and stable his-
tory of public-nonprofit partnerships, and the competitive pressures that 
emanate from the “work first” imperatives are of particular concern—
especially for community-based organizations. Thus, the question of 
whether privatization in a performance-based environment will result 
in better services or distort and ultimately drive out essential, mission-
driven programs bears scrutiny. 
New contracting requirements and competitive demands that force 
nonprofits to compete with for-profits can change their priorities, requir-
ing them to choose between meeting the market test and maintaining 
commitments to their primary mission. After all, “work first” eschews, 
in large part, longer and more intensive education and training in fa-
vor of direct job placement and short-term job readiness skills. Federal 
mandates to the states for caseload engagement place significant pres-
sure on states and localities to meet their placement targets. There is 
also a desire by local officials to reduce costs, improve performance, 
and circumvent the constraints on flexibility and innovation imposed 
by public employee unions. Several jurisdictions have chosen competi-
tive, performance-based contract arrangements as a solution to these 
pressures, awarding million-dollar contracts to a few large, profit-driv-
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en corporations over community-based providers (Barnow and Trutko 
2002). 
This new service environment places enormous demands on all 
participants and will likely determine the success of many. High per-
forming, mission-driven organizations must change to remain relevant. 
But regardless of their merits under a competitive, performance-based 
system, nonprofits and community-based providers have held a unique 
place in the civic infrastructure and historically have played a critical 
role in the job training and placement arena by providing specialized 
services for a diversity of needs in the community. CBOs losing out 
to for-profit providers may have profound effects on the quality and 
appropriateness of the services available—services that would change 
when product standardization is required to achieve economies. The 
speed and scale of change have allowed little systematic evaluation of 
CBOs’ strategies and service records, and advocates of the poor, tradi-
tional providers, and public policy observers question the wisdom of 
rushing into public contracting with private firms. This chapter takes a 
look at nonprofits competing with for-profit providers in four jurisdic-
tions. Our assessment of the likely effect of the changing environment 
pays particular attention to its impact on these indispensable social in-
stitutions. 
The competitive contracting environment created by reengineered 
welfare reform delivery systems is a mixed blessing at best. Some of the 
market incentives have worked in the expected direction by improving 
organizational and service performance and increasing innovation and 
creative adaptations, as seen in a number of nonprofits. Likewise, as 
we shall see in upcoming chapters, many CBO-operated employment 
programs owe their success as well as their survival in this evolving 
industry to effective and creative interorganizational networking, which 
enables them to combine strengths and share administrative functions. 
Intermediaries play an important role in setting up these arrangements. 
Such examples do exist in the face of competition for TANF contract 
awards, including cases of for-profit–nonprofit allegiances. CBOs have 
historically capitalized on high quality placements and the profes-
sional training capacity that for-profit partnerships can provide. They 
now stand to benefit from their access to start-up capital and the tech-
nologically sophisticated systems needed to function under these new 
mandates. For-profits have in turn benefited from subcontracting ar-
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rangements with community-based providers, tapping into their local 
expertise while averting the political backlash that can arise from the 
commercialization of this sensitive service environment. 
Our investigation has revealed, however, that mutually beneficial 
for-profit–nonprofit partnering, and even examples of successful non-
profit collaborations, tend to be more the exception than the rule under 
this system. As they compete for Welfare-to-Work contracts, nonprof-
its in our four sites are experiencing considerable stress in making the 
necessary shifts to become more businesslike in organizational design, 
management, staffing, and culture. The degree of difficulty experienced 
varies considerably among nonprofit and for-profit organizations of dif-
ferent size, experience, sophistication and philosophy. Nonprofits vary 
dramatically among themselves—as much or more than they do from 
their for-profit competitors. For this reason, the increasing seductive-
ness of large government contracts and a desire to make a difference 
in a reengineered human services industry must be tempered by a bal-
anced assessment of mission and capacities. The pressure exerted by 
private-sector competitors in all our sites is considerable, and all CBOs 
understand the tall challenges they face. 
THE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION
In the absence of any existing national survey data that examine 
the impact of these new competitive demands on nonprofit providers, 
we undertook a reconnaissance mission to seek out existing arrange-
ments in jurisdictions that have introduced innovations in the provision 
of services. Four jurisdictions, San Diego, Milwaukee, New York, and 
Houston (see Table 2.1) were selected based on meeting our criteria: 
1) introduction of competition among vendors from each of the sec-
tors, and 2) a change in the number and character of contractors serving 
TANF clients. These case studies include big operators that have had 
a long history in the provision of public services, as well as medium-
sized and smaller agencies that have limited access to the resources and 
capital necessary to compete in a performance-based environment. 
We can discern three types of experiences. Many large, experienced 
and competent organizations are meeting the challenge and, in many 
cases, improving their organizational systems, staff, and programming. 
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Houston Milwaukee New York San Diego
TANF client 
placement
Clients assigned to 1 of 30 
career centers by zip code.
Clients assigned to 1 of 6 
geographic regions, each 
with a sole provider.
TANF contracts are referred 
by Human Resources Ad-
ministration (HRA) first to 
a Skills Assessment and Job 
Placement Center (SAP) 
contractor. If still without 
employment, client will be 
referred by HRA to an Em-
ployment Services and Job 
Placement Center (ESP) 
contractor.
Clients are assigned to 1 of 
6 geographic regions, each 
with a sole provider.
Providers and 
sites per  
provider
6 contractors, each with 
multiple career centers.
5 contractors, all serving a 
single region except 1 that 
has received 2 regions.
5 contractors with the SAP 
contracts, 12 contractors 
with the ESP contracts.
2 contractors run single 
regions, while both county 
officials and ACS State 
and Local Solutions run 2 
regions.
Services pro-
vided to TANF 
clients
Centers are assigned TANF 
clients; receive case man-
agement services including 
assessment, employment 
planning, job readiness and 
job search; refer clients 
for intensive job and basic 
skills training and on-the-
job training.
Contractors complete eli-
gibility determination and 
provide complete services 
all the way through job 
training and placement.
SAP contractors receive 
TANF clients and provide 
skills assessments and ser-
vices through preliminary 
job placement centers.
ESP contractors are referred 
clients who are not placed 
by the SAP contractors; 
they offer more intensive 
employment services and 
job training and placement.
Centers are assigned cli-
ents; they handle all case-
management duties includ-
ing appraisal, assessment, 
and job search training; if 
clients do not succeed in 
finding employment, they 
are referred to a work place-
ment network.
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Bidding  
process







Cost reimbursement: each 
contractor must achieve 
certain levels for eligible 
served, clients receiving 
continued service, clients 
entering employment, and 
clients employed above 
minimum wage.
Pay for performance: con-
tractors must achieve and 
can receive bonuses for 
achieving an entered-em-
ployment placement rate, 
average wage rate, job re-
tention rate, available health 
insurance benefits, full and 
proper engagement, and 
basic education/job skills 
activities. Two optional 
measurements (faith-based 
contracts and basic educa-
tion/job skills attainment) 
may be substituted for the 
bonus portion of 2 of the 
above categories.
Pay for performance: 
SAP—payment is given for 
assessment, engagement in 
employment activities, job 
placement (higher rate for 
30+ hours), with a bonus 
given for high wages and 
90-day placement.
ESP—a percentage of base 
rate or a flat fee is paid for 
placement and 90-day re-
tention, while a higher flat 
fee is paid for high wages, 
left welfare, or placement 
for 180 days.
Pay for performance: cer-
tain amounts are paid for 
participant engagement, 
active caseload, 30-day 




Relatively little. Extensive. Very little for SAP, exten-
sive for ESP.
Very little.
SOURCE: Contract information provided by the following organizations: Houston Department of Human Services, Gulf Coast 
Workforce Board; Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development; Office of Contracts, New York City Comptrollers Office; County 
of San Diego, Contract Operations.
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Even as they do so, however, the demands and philosophy of TANF 
impose programmatic emphases that compromise organizational values 
and challenge long-standing missions. Others, less fiscally sound, find it 
a struggle to develop the capacity to meet the financial and management 
demands of the contracts but have temporarily managed to stay afloat 
through a variety of innovative, short-term survival strategies. A third 
group is at more immediate risk, unable to make the sizable financial 
and organizational investments to compete, and unwilling to capitulate 
to the fundamental challenges to their missions that performance-based 
contracts entail. 
In the sections that follow we discuss the current status of the 
nonprofit sector in the context of this changing environment. We next 
examine the differences in nonprofits’ motivations for competing for 
contracts and the differential effects that their recent adjustments are 
having. We conclude by highlighting the potential dangers for nonprof-
its while citing a few promising examples of effective adaptations and 
solutions to the ongoing challenge of competition. 
STAYING IN THE GAME 
These have been turbulent times for nonprofits. The past two de-
cades have witnessed phenomenal growth in the nonprofit sector, even 
as critics and expert observers have sounded the alarm. The future of 
the sector is under constant scrutiny, but observers’ judgments about its 
condition depend upon whether they have an optimistic or a pessimistic 
outlook. Paul Light (1999) shows how today’s policy environment has 
put pressure on nonprofits to change and has caused many organiza-
tions to feel the squeeze from several sides. Even so, he reminds us 
that the sector has grown in the dollars it receives from contributors 
and government, the size and professionalism of its workforce, and the 
degree to which it inspires career aspirations in a new generation who 
increasingly see the nonprofit sector as their destination (Light 1999). 
Nevertheless, the sector is being compelled to demonstrate its effective-
ness. Increasingly compared with both the public and the private sector, 
nonprofits are being asked to justify their competence and relevance. 
Calls to demonstrate performance in program outcomes, good fiscal 
and organizational management, and efficiency have been mounting 
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from a more sophisticated donor base, funding institutions, boards of 
directors, professionalized staff, and government. Reform movements 
are besetting the sector (Light 1997, 2000).
Government contracts and funding represent an ever-increasing 
portion of nonprofits’ income. In 1982, 56 percent of all social services 
and 48 percent of all employment and training services financed by gov-
ernment were delivered by nonprofits (Salamon 1995, p. 88). Between 
1992 and 1998, public support for employment and training nonprofits 
increased by 44 percent (Lampkin and Pollak 2002, Table 5.8). Today, 
the government-funded portion of social services’ income remains high. 
Although recent data on sources of funding for nonprofit employment 
and training providers alone are hard to find, 1997 data on the portion 
of revenue that nonprofit social-service organizations received from 
government sources put the figure in excess of 52 percent (Lampkin 
and Pollak 2002, pp. 100–101). This figure probably underestimates 
the percentage among employment and training providers, where non-
profits still provide the bulk of services to state and local governments 
and for whom government funding historically made up the single larg-
est source of funding.
While the increasing reliance of state and local governments on 
nonprofits to deliver social services has resulted in considerable growth, 
it has also made these organizations vulnerable to changes in govern-
ment expenditures and policies. A study that analyzed the impact of 
federal welfare waivers on human services nonprofits in the 53 largest 
metropolitan areas from 1992 to 1996 found that 26 percent failed over 
the period (Twombly 2000b). Another study of 13,500 nonprofits most 
likely to be affected by welfare reform found that of the 83 percent that 
were providing core services (including employment-related services), 
revenue was growing, but for a majority of those, expenditures were 
growing faster. Only 41 percent of these nonprofits had positive net bal-
ances for the two years of the latter study, 1992 and 1994 (De Vita 1999, 
p. 221). These data highlight the considerable vulnerability that non-
profits have to policy and funding changes. Some are better capitalized 
and managed; others have more diverse funding streams allowing them 
greater resiliency and adaptability to changing policy demands and eco-
nomic fluctuations.1 And those nonprofits that fail are quickly replaced 
by new entrants—at a rate of three human service providers for each 
one that fails (Twombly 2000b). What seems clear amid the turnover 
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is that greater competition, increasing dependence on government, and 
changing standards and expectations for nonprofit performance pose 
serious challenges for the future.
Fiscal, economic, and effectiveness crises represent ongoing chal-
lenges for nonprofit institutions, but Lester Salamon (1997) has iden-
tified a more fundamental crisis in the nonprofit sector as being one 
of legitimacy (Salamon 1997, p. 41). Salamon poses the problem as a 
fundamental moral and political challenge that questions the sector’s 
continued raison d’etre. Wedded to a nineteenth century image of char-
ity and altruism, public support for nonprofits in the wake of their com-
mercialization, public partnerships, and professionalization appears to 
be on the decline, Salamon (1997) says:  
The nonprofit sector is thus being hoisted on its own mythology. 
Having failed to make clear to the American public what its role 
should be in a mature mixed economy, the sector has been thrown 
on the defensive by revelations that it is not operating the way its 
mythology would suggest. A massive gap has thus opened between 
the modern reality of a sector intimately involved with govern-
ment and moving into commercialization in the wake of govern-
ment cutbacks, and the popular image of a set of community based 
institutions mobilizing purely voluntary energies to assist those in 
need. (p. 42)
Nonprofits—both large institutions and smaller CBOs—engaged in 
Welfare-to-Work contracting are obliged to reexamine their missions, 
governance, and ways of operating, especially in a competitive per-
formance-based service environment. Success requires that they com-
pare themselves with private, for-profit firms and elevate market values 
in their decision-making about what challenges to pursue and how to 
pursue them. As nonprofits move through transition in this environ-
ment, they are more like the “shadow state,” says Wolch (1990): ever in 
conflict about the autonomy they can maintain and the participatory or 
democratic objectives they can pursue. “As the sector struggles to main-
tain itself and develop, it faces a difficult dilemma: to rely increasingly 
on opportunities linked to state privatization initiatives (and, hence, 
subject itself to increasing state control), or to maintain independence 
of organizational purpose but face a continuing struggle for survival 
and resources. Either way, the sector’s survival remains at risk” (Wolch 
1990, p. 19). 
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BEING IN THE GAME BUT KEEPING YOUR SOUL 
Nonprofits that succeeded in the bidding process in the four cities 
we visited were generally experienced service providers with a history 
of contracting to government and with missions focused on serving dis-
advantaged populations. Many, but not all, had provided case manage-
ment, employability assessment, job placement, and training services 
under a variety of government funding streams and private philanthrop-
ic resources. Many also had some degree of skepticism about a future 
under a competitive contract process with for-profit organizations, but 
most were motivated to participate by a commitment to serve low-in-
come populations, as was consistent with their missions.
 Most of those we interviewed held the view that the world is chang-
ing. As Nancy Liu of the Chinese Community Center in Houston said, 
“If you are behind the wagon, then you are behind the wagon no matter 
what. It doesn’t matter what kind of heart that you have. There is just 
no  money for you to have a good heart and not see what the bottom 
line is.”2 Although the role of nonprofit providers in the design of new 
delivery systems and contracts varied and some long-term providers 
expressed dismay about the lack of consultation in the system redesign 
process, all felt that given their experience and mission they should 
have a role in a redesigned system. One nonprofit executive, Sister Ra-
monda Duvall, executive director of Catholic Charities in San Diego, 
described the motivation in these terms: “We bid because we didn’t 
trust the city to deal fairly with the poor. We wanted to have a voice at 
the table. The for-profits have no mission or commitment toward the 
poor. We thought, ‘Once they get a foothold, the nonprofits would be 
out of business.’”3 In a presentation before a group of welfare admin-
istrators from around the country, Sister Duvall further described the 
motivation of Catholic Charities as emanating directly from its mission. 
The federal legislation compelled the organization, she said, to embrace 
“a unique opportunity to do it right” (Duvall 2000).
 In Houston, the Community Services branch of the local AFL-CIO 
bid on a contract and won. Choosing to capitulate to the realities of 
prevailing policy rather than relinquish its role, Community Services 
competed in an arena that labor unions have historically opposed enter-
ing. Loath to undermine the role of public employee unions in provid-
ing public services, labor unions have consistently opposed the practice 
46  Sanger
of contracting services out, and have opposed privatization in particu-
lar. However, the local AFL-CIO director, Richard Shaw, explained the 
situation in terms similar to those Sister Duvall used: that if allowing 
for-profits to compete was the direction the state was headed in, labor 
could not afford to sit out and lose its opportunity to be part of the com-
petition.4 
The nonprofit response to the changing environment is clearly a 
marriage of pragmatism and social mission. Among our interviewees, 
there was the recognition that this was the only game in town—a game 
where the players were eligible for far more resources than most had 
ever been awarded in a single contract before. (See Figure 2.1.) But this 
assessment was balanced by a view voiced by most of those we spoke 
to: that this was the business they were in, and they had a mission-driv-
en belief that they could do it better. Amalia Betanzos, the President of 
Wildcat Service Corporation, which has a $54.7 million contract with 
the city of New York, was particularly enthusiastic about her organiza-
tion’s ability to thrive under a performance-based contract and eager to 
demonstrate Wildcat’s superiority as a provider. “We have always ex-
ceeded our benchmarks so we are pleased with performance-based con-
tracts,” she said. “We want to get paid for our results and will do well 
under this system. If you are good, competition is useful—compared to 
for-profits, our motivations are different: This is our business—this is 
their opportunity.”5 
Many nonprofit heads even claimed they welcomed competition 
from the private sector because they found that the competitive pressures 
made them better, and that the financial structure of their operations and 
their long experience in the community dealing with employers and 
disadvantaged clients gave them a comparative advantage. Most of the 
nonprofits we spoke to—and the majority of nonprofit contractors who 
won bids in the latest round—were relatively well capitalized and had 
been in the business a long time. Compared to the new entrants into the 
system, Betanzos said, “we know exactly what we are.”6 Even so, asset 
levels, even for large nonprofits, are often rather low in comparison to 
the size of contracts they are taking. (See Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2.)
Goodwill Industries of New York, for example, is a large, well-es-
tablished player nationally and in the New York provider community 
and has been in business for more than 80 years. It runs a thrift shop that 
recycles, repairs, and cleans used items like clothing and furniture to be 
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Figure 2.1  Nonprofit Income and Assets (2000) Compared with Contract 
Amount (2001)
           Millions of dollars
NOTE: Goodwill = Goodwill Industries (New York); FEGS = Federal Employment 
and Guidance Services (New York); CWE = Consortium for Worker Education 
(New York); Emp. Solutions = Employment Solutions (Milwaukee); OIC = Op-
portunities Industrialization Center of Greater Milwaukee; UMOS = United Migrant 
Opportunities Services (Milwaukee); SER = SER–Jobs for Progress (Houston).
SOURCE: Information from www.guidestar.org. Ten out of 13 contract providers for 
which data were available are included.
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Table 2.2  County Contracts, Comparing Contract Size to Asset Level of Contractor
Contractor Sector Contract size ($) Assets ($) Income ($)
Milwaukee 
Contract period 2002–2003
YW Works For-profit 65,252,410
UMOS Nonprofit 66,517,591 20,391,592 10,031,453






Catholic Charities Nonprofit 11,018,718 8,347,702 12,650,131
San Diego County Agencies Gov’t entity
Houston  
Contract period 2000–2001
Houston Works Nonprofit 6,988,386 24,000,000
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Interfaith Nonprofit 4,741,718
Gulfcoast Careers of Harris County Gov’t entity 3,463,901
Community Services Program of the 
AFL-CIO




Association for Research and 
Behavior
For-profit 17,797,500
Curtis & Associatesb For-profit 26,932,500
FEGS Nonprofit 20,160,000 80,419,722 100,282,051
MAXIMUS For-profit 3,000,000
Goodwill Industries Nonprofit 35,437,500 27,287,285 39,386,149
ESP Contractors
America Works of New York For-profit 30,630,000
Career and Educational 
Consultants
For-profit 14,355,000
Consortium for Worker Education Nonprofit 8,250,000 33,836,345 7,531,841
New York Urban League Nonprofit 10,197,000 4,780,896 8,182,268
Curtis & Associates For-profit 35,805,000
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a IMS was sold recently by Lockheed Martin to Affiliated Computer Services (ACS), a technology firm based in Dallas. ACS is a 
Fortune 1000 company that operates 79 one-stops with 59 contracts in 36 locations around the country. Because most of the contract 
activity analyzed here came before the merger, reference will be to Lockheed Martin IMS throughout.
b Curtis & Associates was renamed Concera in 2002. In 1998, Benova Inc., headquartered in Portland, Oregon, was acquired by 
AFSA Data Corporation, itself a wholly owned affiliate of FleetBoston Financial Corporation. Benova acquired Curtis & Associates, 
headquartered in Kearney, Nebraska, in 2000. In 2002, Benova, Curtis & Associates, and the government contracting division of AFSA 
Data Corporation, headquarted in Long Beach, California, became the Concera Corporation. Concera specializes in contracting with 
federal, state, and local government agencies to provide a wide range of business process outsourcing solutions.
SOURCE: Information on assets and income from www.guidestar.org as of FY 2000. Blank = not applicable.
Table 2.2  (continued)
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sold in its retail shops across the city. Goodwill uses these businesses to 
train the disabled, low-income populations, and youth for private sector 
employment. In an interview, CEO Rex Davidson identified the com-
parative advantages Goodwill has in philosophy and operations over its 
competitors (both for-profit and nonprofit) for Welfare-to-Work. Hav-
ing its own business gives it independence in how it conducts on-the-
job training. Goodwill’s multiple funding sources—from its business 
activities and from philanthropy—reduce its dependence on govern-
ment. “We have an efficient model to produce programs and service: 
we use for-profit management techniques and sophisticated systems of 
financial management which result in audits that always pass scruti-
ny,” Davidson said. “We run businesses and embrace business-oriented 
management techniques. We are reliable, and our results are predict-
able. We have the lowest overhead in the country and can fund our op-
erations up-front through high capitalization . . . We’re here, and we’ll 
be here when the money dries up.” Furthermore, Goodwill supervisors 
can place clients in employment in their own industry. “We believe in 
the power of work,” Davidson said. “If you don’t work you can’t learn 
to work . . . The dignity of employment—you can’t replace that.”7
Given its scale, reputation, experience, business-oriented values, 
and relationships with employers, Goodwill would appear to be an ideal 
contractor for the city. Indeed, it holds two of the largest contracts in 
New York City’s reengineered welfare delivery system. However, chal-
lenges loom over the new mega-contracts. At a combined $84 million 
for the two contracts over three years,8 the contract dollars represent 
three times Goodwill’s asset base, an amount that makes the organiza-
tion highly vulnerable to the city’s funding and policy shifts. Although 
Davidson argued, “Competition is good. It makes us better, as long 
as it’s not the be all and end all,” Goodwill’s performance at the time 
placed it below average among its competitors in the percentage of cli-
ents placed and in last place for retention—this despite its articulated 
commitment to follow up with clients on the job and its subcontracts 
with many CBOs that provide specialized services in the communities 
where they are located.9 Whether Goodwill’s performance problems 
stem from the scale of its operations, the performance of its subcontrac-
tors, or the city’s generally acknowledged difficulties in referring an 
adequate number of assessed clients, it is clear that even highly capable 
and experienced providers are having difficulties in this environment.
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The big dilemma for the large, stable nonprofits is whether they 
will compromise their mission of putting the client first and provid-
ing to each client what he or she needs. Performance-based contracts 
and current payment levels favor rapid placement of clients and few 
specialized services, which must be paid for out of the fixed maximum 
payments for which contractors are eligible. Many of the nonprofit 
leaders we spoke to bemoan the structure and incentives of the con-
tracts themselves. The Women’s Housing and Economic Development 
Corporation (WHEDCO), unable, on its own, to compete for a prime 
contract, became a partner with America Works and a subcontractor to 
Wildcat Service Corporation in the reengineered service delivery sys-
tem in New York. WHEDCO’s president, Nancy Biberman, describes 
the problem this way: 
The ESP [Employment Services and Job Placement] program and 
contracts were never intended to result in viable jobs for welfare 
recipients. The rapid reduction of the welfare caseload was the 
public policy mandate out of which the ESP program was creat-
ed. The ESP contracts were children of shortsighted social policy 
and privatization ideology, which have proven both costly and in-
appropriate in the human services sector . . . The contracts were 
structured to provide financial incentives for ‘rapid labor market 
attachment’ (the expressly stated goal of HRA [Human Resources 
Administration] Commissioner Jason Turner). Consequently, at 
best they provided quick job placements and woefully unsatisfac-
tory job retention outcomes. The policy has proven egregiously 
myopic. The current labor market contraction has left those with 
the poorest skills most vulnerable to layoffs. Had the ESP contracts 
been structured to enable participants to develop marketable skills 
before diving into low-wage dead-end jobs, perhaps long-term job 
retention could have been achieved. But the payment milestones 
in these ‘performance-based’ contracts, coupled with WEP [The 
Work Experience Program], forced even the most mission-driven 
providers into unconscionable work.” (Biberman 2001, p. 4)
WHEDCO described itself as the poster child for employment and 
training providers because it embraces a holistic approach to meet-
ing clients’ needs. An association with America Works should there-
fore have boosted the visibility and legitimacy of America Works. In 
an arrangement brokered by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation 
(LISC), a community development intermediary, WHEDCO devel-
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oped a for-profit subsidiary to partner with America Works on America 
Works’ $30 million New York City contract. But the relationship quick-
ly soured. As its partner, WHEDCO found America Works’ service to 
clients inadequate and saw its profit-maximizing behavior as robbing 
clients of needed support services. Indeed, as a mission-driven nonprofit 
that served more than 50 percent of America Works’ clients, WHEDCO 
had to cross-subsidize its payments per placement from America Works 
with other resources in order to provide the needed support services 
for its clients. “We barely broke even on the arrangement because we 
provided layer upon layer of solid supportive services,” Biberman said. 
“But it was our investment that made America Works’ performance so 
good.”
WHEDCO terminated its relationship with America Works in the 
spring of 2001 because of serious differences in approach and philoso-
phy. America Works objected to the time and cost WHEDCO incurred 
in providing additional social services, thereby hurting its bottom line. 
WHEDCO claimed that America Works’ highly favorable performance 
outcomes reflected the significant investment WHEDCO had made in 
supplementing services, not the placements America Works made itself. 
Regardless, the strategy seemed to work for America Works, which cur-
rently outperforms all other New York City contractors on both place-
ment and retention. 
The dissolution of this relationship reflects a considerable dispar-
ity of values and approach that many feel characterizes profound cul-
tural differences in the way non- and for-profit providers approach their 
work. WHEDCO was bound by its social service mission and unwill-
ing to capitulate to a bottom line regardless of the economic rationale 
for doing so. The tension between contractual requirements and mis-
sion appears less troubling to private sector contractors. Indeed, when 
we queried Ed Gund, senior vice president and chief operating officer 
at IMS at the time, about the conflict between mission and contrac-
tual demands, he responded, “The quality and character of services are 
all contract driven. If you want a particular service, put it in the con-
tract.”10 This was echoed by David Mastran, chief executive officer at 
MAXIMUS, a provider of program management, information technol-
ogy, and consulting services to government agencies. “What gets mea-
sured and rewarded gets done,” Mastran says.
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Use of mechanisms like grant diversion and forming a temporary 
employment agency, which were central to America Works’ strategy, 
appear less popular among other firms we have spoken to. With the ex-
ception of Seedco’s limited liability corporation (LLC), few have used 
these mechanisms effectively and some, such as ARBOR, have rejected 
them outright, eschewing the documentation required and the loss in 
lifetime benefits that TANF clients experience when they use up pre-
cious months of their lifetime limit because of grant diversion.11 
However, when for-profits collaborate with nonprofits, culture clash 
is a more common theme. For many for-profits, the use of nonprofits 
and smaller proprietary providers as subs and partners is a short-term 
necessity if they are to meet the service demands of their many new for-
profit contracts. But in practice, private and nonprofit cultures seldom 
harmonize. The large for-profits dominating this field see their role dif-
ferently from most nonprofits. David Heaney of MAXIMUS in San Di-
ego stressed the importance of selecting subs with “services you need, 
political influence, a good fit philosophically and organizationally, and 
[a compatibility with your] culture.”12 In Milwaukee and San Diego 
the use of subcontractors was crucial for increasing both capacity and 
breadth of services. Local subcontractors—especially CBOs—were 
important for their political influence and their knowledge of the local 
culture and community resources. “We made some stupid decisions by 
not understanding the culture—though we should have understood it,” 
said Jerry Stepaniak, a MAXIMUS executive. “We were under great 
scrutiny politically and the [state legislative] audits revealed some in-
sensitivities on our part; MAXIMUS drops in a new place where politics 
and community relations can be a problem. There is a huge advantage 
to knowledge of the community and political culture. We’ve figured out 
how to tap that, either by collaborating with nonprofit subcontractors, 
or [by] becoming a major subcontractor for a nonprofit prime.”13
 Subcontractors, too, were held to performance standards. “There 
are explicit criteria that these subcontracts must reach through retention 
and number served,” said George Leuterman, Stepaniak’s predecessor 
as vice president for welfare reform. “We are a business. We have a 
contract. We hold your hands to the fire. If you do well, you get a good 
reputation.”14
YW Works in Milwaukee also formed an LLC with private sec-
tor partners but severed its relationship after the first contract period 
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for similar kinds of disagreements in style and values. Leuterman of 
MAXIMUS distinguishes between how for-profits and nonprofits view 
this work. “The county is our customer,” he says. “There is a power 
inequality with the client, and we recognize it. But the client is not your 
customer. They are not paying you. We provide services for our client, 
which is the county . . . Our motto is, ‘When you are doing something 
that is not in your contract, you are volunteering.’ The nonprofits have 
more flexibility.”15
Only in Houston, where contractors are paid on a cost basis for 
specified services up to a maximum, is there an incentive to vary the 
service package. Yet even in that city concerns have been raised about 
contractors choosing clients that are the easiest to serve to ensure higher 
success rates. The diversified funding streams that characterize many of 
the nonprofits, but none of the for-profits (like foundation and private 
fund-raising sources), can provide for cross-subsidy and cost-sharing 
among different programs, thus allowing them to pay for services cli-
ents may need but for which current contract amounts do not provide. 
Obviously the economic incentives built into these contracts offer much 
less latitude and pose a dilemma for mission driven nonprofits. 
A recent development in Wisconsin following a state legislative au-
dit in Milwaukee provides additional grounds for concern about the 
perverse effects—even for mission driven nonprofits—of the economic 
incentive central to the contract design (Johnson 2001). Milwaukee’s 
contracts are comprehensive and include eligibility determination in 
addition to job readiness and placement services. The Milwaukee W-2 
Advisory Panel recommended changes in the Milwaukee program in 
response to revelations by state audits that relatively few clients were 
advised by contracting agencies of the range of available services for 
which they were eligible. Further, the audits confirmed that few had 
been given adequate assessment of their needs, had been lifted out of 
poverty, or had been placed in more intensive education and training 
programs that might have led to self-supporting jobs. The implications 
of the audits were that contract agencies simply didn’t offer services 
if clients didn’t request them. The money saved by not offering them, 
presumably, represented cost savings to the contractors and contributed 
to their profits.
 In response, under a newly funded arrangement, the state has al-
located $5 million for a contract for county workers to assume the role 
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at the “front door,” undertaking client assessments and informing them 
of the services for which they are eligible, including job training and 
food stamps. Then they will be referred to the appropriate W-2 agen-
cies. These changes are designed to insure that clients are made aware 
of their entitlements and the supportive services available. The need for 
changes like these, however, illustrates the potential conflicts between 
the cost saving (profit maximizing) incentives inherent in performance-
based contracts and serving clients’ interests. The legislative audit un-
covered evidence of potentially serious consequences of the economic 
incentives inherent in the contract’s design, absent systems to insure 
appropriate monitoring and accountability. These were dangers gener-
ally thought to exist only when for-profit firms provided the services: 
most observers viewed the values of nonprofits and their missions as 
insurance against contractual abuses. But both were found to have de-
nied clients critical access to information about their eligibility for addi-
tional services and program resources. Whether or not these oversights 
were necessary to meet contract demands, we see that nonprofits may 
be forced to capitulate to market pressures, compromising their values 
to remain competitive with for-profits.
LIVING BY THEIR WITS 
Large, stable nonprofits with large and diversified funding streams 
appear relatively secure. In may ways they resemble their for-profit com-
petitors more than they do their leaner, less business-oriented counter-
parts among nonprofit providers.16 But many nonprofits in the employ-
ment and training business that we spoke to are facing an insecure future 
in a changing environment. Some of the medium-sized and smaller or-
ganizations are regrouping, shifting their focus and looking for alterna-
tive sources of both government and private funding. These efforts to 
survive combine a search for new dollars, development of new areas of 
program growth, investments in improved management to achieve cost 
savings, and some efforts to embrace private market techniques. Some 
have developed for-profit subsidiaries to realize some of the benefits 
that accrue to the for-profit providers. Catholic Charities in San Diego 
was typical. That provider underwent a significant management reor-
ganization, including the development of a more professionalized set 
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of management and personnel systems, and introduction of a new gen-
eration of technology and information systems in order to be competi-
tive and manage its recent contracts with the county. Similarly, Houston 
Works has modernized to such a degree that some contractors we in-
terviewed described it as having become the leading edge in business 
technology—comparable to industry leaders like the for-profit Lockheed 
Martin IMS (now ACS State and Local Solutions—see Note 10).
A particularly innovative effort characterized one of the smaller 
nonprofits that won a $7.4 million contract in New York. Seedco, a 
highly respected medium-sized nonprofit with areas of investment that 
include community and economic development, workforce develop-
ment, and housing, has built a collaborative with 15 CBOs. It provides 
them with technical assistance while helping them to provide employ-
ment training and job placement to TANF recipients under the New 
York City contract.17 Organized as a subsidiary to the nonprofit Seedco, 
the Non-Profit Assistance Corporation (N-PAC) has structured a limited 
liability corporation named EarnFair to take advantage of a variety of 
private sector incentives such as the ability to use allowable tax cred-
its as an eligible employer of welfare recipients. As an LLC, EarnFair 
can operate as a temporary employment agency and syndicate these 
tax credits, using the additional resources from their sale to subsidize 
increased and more intensive services to the clients it serves. Further, 
the N-PAC subsidiary runs the Welfare-to-Work program using the col-
laboration of CBOs and generates additional funding from a diverse set 
of resources including philanthropic and other public funds.
Seedco’s president, Bill Grinker, an innovator in human services 
and a former HRA commissioner himself, described the vision this 
way: “We view ourselves as a management service entity. The key 
service provision is provided through CBOs. Our interest is in provid-
ing information systems, capacity, financial assistance, and technical, 
programmatic types of supports. While theoretically we are the prime 
contractor, we view the CBOs as partners rather than subs . . . Even 
so, these CBOs would most likely be closed out of these contracts had 
they not been able to come under the umbrella of a well managed, fis-
cally sound prime.”18 In actuality, N-PAC functions as a conduit for 
resources and information, “pooling together public and private grants 
and funds that it passes on to the subcontractor,” said Tracie McMillan. 
“As a result, N-PAC has to rely on job placements for only 50 percent of 
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its funding, freeing up considerable resources to invest in longer-term 
training” (McMillan 2001). Perhaps most important, Seedco manages 
the financial risk for the CBOs by basing their payments only partially 
on performance and the rest on a line item cost basis. The transparency 
with which each partner shares the performance data of its other part-
ners creates pressure on each to be accountable.
The $7.4 million contract from the city represents only 20 percent 
of the resources N-PAC is allocating to this effort. The rest comes from 
the syndicated tax credits; other partners such as the United Way; the 
New York Community Trust; and LISC, a community development 
intermediary. These resources allow innovative programmatic designs 
that go well beyond what competitors could provide, specifically the 
for-profits. Indeed, the EarnFair model provides post-placement sup-
port services and case management for participants for two years. It 
operates as a temp agency but provides supervision of workers after 
placement with a private employer and provides additional supports on 
the job, including transitional services, fringe packages, counseling, and 
financing. Total wage packages are assembled that include the value of 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). “The EarnFair Model is a good 
example of Seedco’s high standards for all our products,” said Diane 
Baillargeon, Seedco’s senior vice president. “The program design itself 
embodies some of the best thinking in the Welfare-to-Work field about 
effective interventions. We also have in place a plan for long-term fi-
nancing. We’re not looking for financing that consists of one big gov-
ernment contract, but for diverse revenue streams. Having seen non-
profits struggle when government contracts are cut, or living hand to 
mouth year after year, it’s exciting to me to be working on economically 
sustainable financing for social purposes” (Seedco 1999). 
A nonprofit in Milwaukee developed a simpler yet still innovative 
partnership to bid for a contract in that city. The YWCA partnered with 
CNR Health and the Kaiser Group to form a limited liability corpora-
tion to bid in one of Milwaukee’s five contracting regions. In this ar-
rangement, the YWCA became the managing partner of YW Works, 
controlling day-to-day operations, while Kaiser and CNR Health pro-
vided many of the management systems and technological supports 
(Yates 1997).19 The Y had “a lot to bring to the table” since it had been 
involved since the 1920s in employment and training—especially non-
traditional training for women, Rita Rinner, YW Works’ chief operat-
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ing officer, reported. When the first requests for proposals (RFPs) were 
released in Milwaukee for W-2, she said, “we wanted other expertise. 
We felt it was too risky to go it alone. CNR was a software developer, 
and we worried about the size of the budget and the risk of debt from a 
capitated payment if we failed. We needed technology, an MIS system, 
and help with reporting systems. Partners could help.”20 
 These kinds of partnerships allow nonprofits to capture the ben-
efits of private sector capital, efficiencies, and management expertise 
while operating in a manner consistent with their missions. Private sec-
tor partners helped to underwrite the risk, hire staff, and build needed 
infrastructure. In the second round of Milwaukee contracts, however, 
YW Works dissolved the relationship and bid alone. Whatever the ini-
tial advantages, cultural differences in style and values plagued the re-
lationship. Once YW Works felt confident of its own managerial and 
technological capacity, it was less dependent on the partnership. Its pri-
vate partners lost some interest as well. They found the environment 
and the bias against for-profits inhospitable. The political heat and the 
controversy that typically accompany the entrance of for-profit provid-
ers into a service area historically dominated by government and non-
profits made the arrangement uncomfortable. County providers around 
the state “have the view that private agencies can’t be responsible with 
public funds,” Rinner said.21 But the arrangement served the short-term 
transitional needs of the Y and helped set it up for an independent op-
eration with the capacity to go it alone.
Innovative partnerships served some nonprofits well. But other tra-
ditional employment and training providers were scrambling to stay in 
business. Many viewed the payment levels and schedules as unrealisti-
cally low under these contracts. A smaller contractor in New York who 
was unable to bid directly on any of the contracts became a subcontrac-
tor under two of the primes (one for-profit and one nonprofit). “Our 
reimbursement as a sub won’t cover our costs,” she said. “We’ll have 
to fundraise to cover costs . . . But our key advantage is our diversified 
funding. We see government contracts as defraying costs, not covering 
them.”22 That observation rang true for Liu in Houston as well. “If you 
[as a local CBO] rely totally on government money,” she said, “it is 
almost impossible for you to survive.”23 The contracts provide no in-
centive for long-term investment, and for the subs who must relinquish 
overhead to the prime, current payment schedules may pay only a frac-
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tion of the true costs of serving a disadvantaged client. But accepting 
these subcontracts allows for financial piggybacking and economies of 
scale in multiple program cost-sharing.
For small nonprofits, whose financial solvency depends upon their 
performance, reasonable numbers, high quality referrals, and timely 
payment for performance (which depends upon the administrative per-
formance of both the county or city and the prime), the financial risks 
are clearly high. A generalized concern among the nonprofits we spoke 
to, all of whom are acting as subcontractors, had to do with referrals. 
They feared, first, that the city would not refer sufficient numbers of 
eligible clients in a timely fashion to the prime to support the heavy in-
vestment in program operations. And worse, they feared that the primes 
might ‘cream’ the most job-ready clients for themselves and refer out 
the most difficult and costly to place—those with multiple barriers to 
employment.
Diane Baillargeon was senior vice president of Seedco at the time 
I interviewed her and wrote this chapter; she now is president. Bail-
largeon is familiar with the plight of many CBOs. “There are already 
nonprofits—mostly small, relatively low capacity community-based or-
ganizations—[that] have gotten out of the business,” she reported, “and 
I know personally of a number of organizations that simply have said, 
‘We can’t compete in this business any longer,’ and they have gotten out 
of it. Now, most of them are multiservice, social service, community-
based community centers, and they are still operating their domestic 
violence program and their homeless shelter and all of that, but they are 
no longer in the workforce business. And I think that’s a loss.”24
In Houston, the system is designed to provide “customer choice.”25 
No contract is signed with subcontractors and CBOs. Instead, training 
providers are chosen by the clients themselves after being counseled 
and given provider information by contractors at career centers. This 
system wreaks havoc on providers’ planning processes, since they are 
unable to anticipate the demand for their services and the staffing those 
services might require. Furthermore, in order to attract and keep clients, 
they must provide considerable information and do aggressive market-
ing. These are investments that they have no assurance they will be able 
to recoup, and ones for which they typically haven’t much expertise. 
Often CBOs invest considerable resources in initial recruiting and train-
ing before they refer clients to career centers to be certified, hoping they 
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will return for more intensive services. These up-front investments are 
difficult for smaller nonprofits and CBOs to finance themselves. The 
process, known as reverse referrals, was seen as extremely costly for 
the nonprofits, but also necessary to ensure that at least some initial 
contacts would return to their organization. If they fail to find and attract 
a sufficient number of clients—who after all have a tremendous number 
of choices (over 6,000 qualified providers at last count)—thousands of 
traditional nonprofit providers may be forced to close their doors, seek 
new funding streams, or refocus their efforts on new service areas.
The current strategy of the municipalities we studied has been to 
find a few experienced contractors with good track records and suf-
ficient technological and managerial expertise to provide the services 
and information necessary to ensure full participation and job place-
ment of all eligible clients. Federal mandates and the terms of perfor-
mance-based contracts require information systems to track and verify 
the progress of all clients in the system, and these demands often re-
quire sophisticated technology and management systems. Many of the 
for-profit providers have considerable advantages in providing these 
systems. Indeed, Seedco used the philanthropic resources it raised for 
its innovative effort to purchase MIS software from a subsidiary of 
MAXIMUS—allowing it the same kind of capacity for its LLC as the 
for-profit firms. But the development of these systems is expensive, 
even if they are bought “off the shelf,” and few small organizations 
have the resources for those kinds of investments.
In New York and Milwaukee, nonprofit providers have had a 
long history and good performance record of providing employment 
and training services, yet many lack the necessary technological and 
managerial systems to manage performance-based contracts. Further, 
because the timing of payments depends on contractors’ performance 
in Milwaukee, New York, and San Diego, and on systems to verify 
placements, considerable up-front capital is necessary to undertake 
these contracts. The for-profits have quite a few advantages over the 
nonprofits in assuming the risks. They have greater capacity to sustain 
operations in anticipation of future payment streams, since they have 
access to investment capital. Only a fraction of the nonprofits histori-
cally operating in the employment and training business have the ability 
to stay the course while they wait for payment. So serious was the threat 
to contractors in New York that the City was forced to provide some 
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up-front working capital to float the start-up cost of their large TANF 
contracts. 
Clearly the availability of working capital, an asset more likely 
to characterize the larger for-profit companies, is a key factor in how 
competitive nonprofit providers can be over time. As Richard Shaw of 
the Houston AFL-CIO put it, “First you have to have the money to 
spend the money, which is a real problem for small companies.”26 How 
well capitalized an organization needs to be to remain solvent in this 
environment depends in large part on the competence and efficiency 
of the public agency responsible for reviewing and authorizing pay-
ments. Timely and accurate payments and an adequate flow of client 
referrals to providers are an indication of the management systems and 
capability of public agencies, and their recent track record is not en-
couraging. Even large, well-managed nonprofits such as Goodwill and 
Wildcat worried about the city’s capacity to insure that these functions 
ran smoothly.
New York’s HRA has been notoriously poor at paying its vendors in 
a timely manner. So problematic has been this lack of capacity that the 
City has had to advance most of the contractors payments of up to three 
months to keep them afloat. The City has launched a new computer-
ized system to receive vendor placements, make referrals, and speed up 
the process of calculating and verifying payments. Although the system 
promises to improve upon the City’s speed of payments, as recently as 
2002 vendors still complained about the backlog and the amounts they 
were owed. This falls particularly heavily on subcontractors whose pay-
ments flow from the City to the prime and then on to them. Biberman 
of WHEDCO, which subcontracts for two large primes, found her orga-
nization caught in the middle. “One of the most debilitating footnotes 
to this story involves untimely payments of the paltry funds available 
under these contracts,” she said. “At any given time, our organization 
awaited at least $100,000 in receivables from prime contractors. We 
had no recourse to the City, although we tried. Indeed, when we learned 
that a prime contractor had already been paid by the City for the work 
we had done, the City officials told us that we should sue the prime for 
payment!” (Biberman 2001).
The concern over the ability of cities to refer clients resonates 
around the country. “It is the biggest issue we face,” said Holli Payne of 
MAXIMUS. “It really is like pulling teeth trying to get these clients out 
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of the system. The bureaucracy is horrible. For example, in Philadelphia 
there are 65,000 clients on welfare. MAXIMUS had a contract to serve 
200, yet the City could not produce that many people for MAXIMUS to 
serve. They are inefficient and ineffective.”27
ON THE BRINK 
Smaller, community-based nonprofits, which historically have pro-
vided employment and training services to low-income populations, 
represent a large and diverse group nationwide. Before the Workforce 
Investment Act of 1998 (WIA), there were 163 federal programs that 
funded employment and training. Under these titles, tens of thousands 
of nonprofit and for-profit organizations have received contracts and 
grants. In New York City alone, more than 115 individual providers 
had one or more employment and training contracts under federal titles 
prior to the newly awarded TANF contracts and the commencement of 
the WIA programs.28 Their capacity to compete in a more performance-
based environment varies enormously, but most of the organizations 
we spoke to believed they would “get by” in the short run. Few small 
organizations had the ability to bid on the TANF contracts given the 
scale and organizational capacity requirements they entailed, and those 
that did often did so as a collaborative, such as in San Diego. There, a 
collaborative of nonprofits in the South Bay community bid to serve 
that community as the Metropolitan Area Advisory Committee. They 
did not, however, win the contract and are currently litigating the de-
cision, questioning the fairness of the bidding process. In New York, 
where the bidding process was not the typical open competitive process 
but a negotiated acquisition, the city invited organizations to bid, and 
many historical small nonprofit contractors were closed out. A number 
of small, experienced providers lost their contracts with the city in what 
has been described as a shakeout.
Because of the scale of these efforts, however, most of the prime 
contractors in Milwaukee and New York by necessity have either so-
licited CBOs or responded to CBOs’ requests to act as subcontractors 
or link with these organizations to provide training and support for cli-
ents with special training or social service needs. Under current bid-
ding processes to select providers to serve TANF clients, many his-
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torical providers will continue to serve portions of the caseload, albeit 
to a limited extent. (There will be additional opportunities for many 
of them to compete for clients under the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
(USDOL) WIA programs, but success under that system depends pri-
marily on the selection of a provider not by jurisdiction but by customer.) 
Furthermore, many of the national for-profit providers (and large local 
nonprofits) like ACS State and Local Solutions and MAXIMUS have 
selected CBOs as subs, in part to mitigate the political backlash against 
them in the communities where they have won contracts. Subcontracts 
with CBOs have a number of valuable practical and political payoffs 
as for-profits enter new markets. In the short run they can learn from 
CBOs, which have a better understanding of particular client needs and 
a connection to the resources in the community that serve them. Beyond 
that, their association with well known and trusted community orga-
nizations provides some political cover, helping to co-opt and deflect 
criticism from groups that might otherwise be their opponents. 
For the time being, then, many CBOs and smaller nonprofits may 
survive, even as they scramble to change their programmatic focus, seek 
other sources of public and private support, and serve the short-term 
needs of large contractors. Over the longer term, most observers we 
interviewed predicted that many of the weaker providers would scale 
back or close down. Since the industry varies enormously in quality 
and fiscal soundness, the consequences for many small providers may 
be dire. Their loss will have a mixed effect on the quality and range of 
available services.
Many small providers serve populations with special needs. Anita 
Moses, a small contractor who lost her contract when the city of New 
York reorganized its delivery system, said the old system had its merits. 
“Good CBOs in communities are linked to providers and understand the 
needs of their clients,” she said. “You have them and you know them. 
Some CBOs are bad, some mediocre, but CBOs have unique advan-
tages.”29 For example, The Chinatown Manpower Project in New York 
has historically served Chinese speaking clients, whose ability and will-
ingness to benefit from training and employment services provided by a 
borough-wide contractor under the new service delivery arrangements 
are limited. Whether current contracting and referral arrangements can 
preserve the services that may be critical to special populations located 
in particular communities is questionable. Many fear that populations 
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like ex-offenders, ethnic populations, and drug addicts may be poor-
ly served. They also worry that welfare applicants from these groups, 
when they are diverted to job placement and employment training, may 
simply disappear, falling through the cracks of a system that has no ca-
pacity to meet their special language and cultural needs.
The career center contractor we spoke to in Houston, as well as 
interest groups there, fears the consequences of this shakeup. “In my 
opinion, when we lose the little guy [e.g., the small CBO], we lose the 
hard-to-serve clients, because that is who they trust and who they go 
to,” said Lockheed Martin IMS head Carol Anderson. “They are not 
coming to my career center because I am there. They have to feel some 
reason to be comfortable and safe to come. When we lose the contract, 
we lose a lot.”30 But other observers saw the possible thinning of the 
provider ranks as being healthy, by reducing the number of weaker and 
less able providers and strengthening the field overall.
The smaller nonprofit contractors in Houston “do a lot more than 
what the performance standards measure,” says Jesse Castanada, head 
of a CBO there, yet their dedication to their mission does not allow 
them to cut services even if current contract arrangements fail to reim-
burse them for their additional costs.31 Mission drives the service poli-
cies of Castanada’s organization, SER–Jobs for Progress of the Texas 
Gulf Coast, but two of the smallest CBOs with contracts have been 
placed on probation and threatened with contract revocation because of 
the difficulty they have had in getting their operations off the ground, 
and in part because of their unwillingness to capitulate on their service 
commitments in order to adhere to the economic realities of their con-
tracts.
 There is evidence that New York City’s HRA is worried too. Cur-
rent contract designs that provide incentives for immediate placement 
but allocate limited resources for longer-term support have not fared 
as well as expected. A recent summary on placement and retention 
rates of ESP contractors revealed average placement rates of 29 per-
cent and retention rates of 9 percent at 90 days and of only 3 percent at 
six months. (Individual contractor performance varies greatly; retention 
rates at each milestone range from 2 to 28 percent and from 0 to 14 
percent respectively.)32 Many view the poor performance, especially in 
job retention, as being due to the lack of intensive services for clients 
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with special needs. Historically, the providers most often serving these 
populations have been the CBOs.
So much controversy has attended the poor performance of and the 
weak support for CBOs in the contracting system that the city of New 
York recently awarded, through a negotiated acquisition process, 30 
new contracts to serve special populations under WIA. The contracts 
were awarded exclusively to nonprofits, mostly CBOs. This represents 
a big victory for advocates who have questioned the viability of the 
current contracts to serve a caseload marked by daunting labor market 
barriers. It also reflects the city’s increasing recognition that job reten-
tion among all contractors is very low. While only 21 contracts have so 
far been registered, these alone represent a large additional city invest-
ment in CBOs providing support services for the most difficult and vul-
nerable parts of the caseload, those clients with multiple barriers. The 
signed contracts already total more than $75 million. Although quite 
recent, they will provide sizable cash advances, more adequate funding, 
regularized reimbursements, and a recognition of the more intensive 
service needs that some clients have if they are to enter into and retain 
employment.
While risks abound for CBOs, the organizations themselves vary 
enormously in capacity, resourcefulness, and promise. Bill Grinker of 
Seedco’s N-PAC described those nonprofits living on the brink as “a 
mixed bag in terms of capacity and ability to survive. Many will remain 
subs in the short run.” The problem over the long run will be that, as 
the for-profits develop connections in the community, they will have 
less need for these CBOs and greater incentive to save the overhead 
devoted to managing them. Even for those CBOs that currently have 
contracts, there is the question of whether performance-based contracts 
will drive them out because of their lack of capital to sustain themselves 
while they wait for payment. Grinker also questioned whether the for-
profits would continue to need the political protection they now enjoy 
through the connection they have with CBOs that serve as their subs. 
Moses, the long-term city employment contractor who lost her contract 
when the city administration reorganized service delivery in New York, 
viewed the selection process as entirely politically motivated, granting 
large contracts to mayoral favorites, politically connected for-profits, 
and large, established nonprofits. “What we will lose is the human ele-
ment,” she says. “Smaller providers are better than larger ones. Small 
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nonprofits are driven by values and mission, and their staff is more con-
cerned with people than numbers. All this gets lost in bigness—clients 
get lost.”33 
Richard Bonamarte, formerly the HRA executive deputy respon-
sible for designing the original contracts, explained that the decision to 
select a few large contractors was based on a recognition that a major 
employment engine was needed to manage the large flow of clients, and 
that that would require providers whose scale of operations, systems ca-
pacity, and experience could handle a performance-based environment. 
Yet the design made an express attempt to protect the survival of the 
CBOs. “Many nonprofits, especially CBOs, have limited cash flows, 
low surpluses, and no professionalized financial systems and manage-
ment capacities to deal with performance-based contracts,” he said. “A 
major idea behind these contract designs was to allow smaller nonprof-
its to work as subcontractors under the primes and to reduce their expo-
sure, to protect them and nurture them. They [the smaller nonprofits and 
CBOs] represent much of our infrastructure, and infrastructure takes 
so long to develop . . . You don’t want to lose community-grounded 
organizations.”34 
Ironically, the CBOs see their exclusion as prime contractors in the 
selection process and their limited role as subcontractors as a repudia-
tion of their contributions, and as the cause of their current problems. 
New York subcontractor Biberman described the situation facing non-
profit subcontractors as morally and financially untenable: 
The private and nonprofit contractors tend not to subcontract; the 
nonprofit contractors do more of it. In either case, prime contrac-
tor and subcontractor survival is predicated on doing as little work 
as possible. The city pays the primes only when they have certi-
fied that a recipient is in the labor force. For the average commu-
nity-based subcontractor, $1,700 is received at initial placement, 
$1,300 at 90-day job retention and $200 at 180-day retention! 
Simple calculus coupled with the suspension of social mission 
drive[s] the implementation of these contracts in one direction: 
placement only . . . The subcontractors in these contracts are losing 
their shirts, both in financial terms and in the mutilation of their 
social missions, not to mention the morale of their staffs . . . Hon-
orable community based subcontractors cannot[,] in conscience, 
work in this way; and so through philanthropic help and often at  
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serious financial peril, they cobble together literacy assistance, so-
cial services, child care, etc. (Biberman 2001)
Thus, while small nonprofits have the motivation to stay alive and 
fulfill their mission, few have the resources and capacity to compete on 
their own, and many fear that, even as subcontractors, their future is 
in doubt. They complain of inadequate payment by the primes and of 
documentation and information processing demands that are as exces-
sive and costly as when they reported directly to the city. In San Diego, 
contractors with case-management contracts refer clients to CBOs for 
particular services, but payments are capped, and performance-based 
contracts may impose severe constraints on small organizations that 
must wait for payment until a client has been employed and retained 
for up to six months. In Houston, where the contracts for case manage-
ment at one-stop centers merge TANF clients with others served under 
USDOL titles, clients themselves select from the service providers that 
the city has qualified as eligible. Nonprofit and for-profit providers, 
therefore, compete for clients, and those with better connections and 
marketing expertise are likely to win out. Many CBOs have trouble 
competing in this environment.
CONCLUSION
Nonprofits are clearly sailing in uncharted waters. The new de-
mands on nonprofits to compete in a reengineered welfare delivery sys-
tem where market forces compete with traditional values has created 
real hazards. When missions collide with financial, managerial, and 
programmatic imperatives induced by new contractual arrangements, 
many nonprofits are forced to question their traditional roles as protec-
tors of the poor and champions of progressive social values. Even so, 
many have adapted creatively to the new challenges, improving their 
performance, competing effectively on price, and developing innova-
tive means to protect their missions. Many others, however, are strug-
gling.
Much has been made of the inherent disadvantages that many non-
profits have in the new welfare service delivery markets, where they 
now compete with large, national for-profit firms (Ryan 1999; Frumkin 
and Andre-Clark 1999). They lack the management systems and the 
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information technology needed to manage large and complex contracts. 
They have a comparative disadvantage in attracting government execu-
tives with welfare expertise, and they are constrained by their nonprofit 
status from raising capital in the financial markets. They lack both the 
capacity and the experience to handle the scale of operation that new 
contracts require. These are formidable handicaps.
But nonprofits in this industry have considerable strengths that na-
tional for-profit providers lack. As Baillargeon said, “They’re really 
known entities in the community that they serve, they have a respected 
level of cultural competence, they offer other kinds of services, they al-
ready have preexisting connections to the target populations that we’re 
talking about. I think, in fact, they will do very well.”35 Besides those at-
tributes that Baillargeon ticked off, nonprofits have the ability to fund-
raise both from individuals and from major philanthropic organizations. 
These resources allow them to enrich their programs and provide addi-
tional services that contract dollars might not cover. In that respect they 
can often offer higher quality services than their for-profit competitors.
But we have seen that nonprofits providing welfare services vary as 
much from one another as they do from their private sector competitors. 
And many traditional providers have been closed out of the reengineered 
delivery systems we have studied. As a consequence, the adaptations 
nonprofits have made and their success in meeting the challenges show 
considerable variation. Some of the large, experienced nonprofits have 
a solid foothold in the markets we examined and appear to be holding 
their own. The speed with which all contractors have had to gear up, 
transform their systems, hire staff, and achieve placements has strained 
the resources of everyone we interviewed—profit and nonprofit alike. 
Early implementation has been rocky in many cases. While few data 
are available on the relative performance of individual contractors and 
subcontractors, the numbers we have uncovered in New York and San 
Diego suggest that no single factor can explain the wide variation in 
prime contractor performance in placements and retention. There is no 
obvious or consistent pattern by size of contract, size of organization, 
or sectoral status.36 Since in theory referrals are randomly allocated by 
borough in New York, differences in client characteristics cannot ex-
plain the bulk of the disparities we observe. Start-up problems—many 
of which were the result of the city’s performance—no doubt explain 
some of the variations. But nonprofits competing as primes appear, in 
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general, to be no better or worse than their private sector competitors. 
Competition first confronted these vendors when they had to re-
spond to an RFP, and few made the initial cut. Existing providers, 
therefore, are likely to be those that were strongest. For example, Op-
portunities Industrialization Center (OIC) and United Migrant Oppor-
tunities Services (UMOS) in Milwaukee and Federal Employment and 
Guidance Services (FEGS), Wildcat, and Goodwill Industries in New 
York are big operators that have had a long history of public service 
provision. They were the most likely to succeed. Thus, the selection of a 
few experienced organizations, most of which were well-respected (and 
politically connected) providers in the community, left many CBOs and 
small and medium-sized providers out of the game. Few even had the 
ability to bid on these contracts, given the contracts’ scale and organiza-
tional requirements. These CBOs’ role as subcontractors has been more 
limited, and their success is still in question. Little technical assistance 
or management support has been available except in a few cases such 
as with Seedco’s N-PAC, whose very design is structured to allow it to 
play the role of a management services entity.
 Efforts like the one that created N-PAC are the sorts of highly fo-
cused initiatives that have the potential to sustain high quality opera-
tions that include smaller organizations in collaborative arrangements 
by which they can share resources and management systems. Networks 
of agencies can consolidate functions and share administrative tasks, 
and as a group they may be in a better position to attract funding, con-
tracts, and capital financing. Some cost-sharing, particularly when it 
comes to expensive overhead, can help financially strapped smaller 
agencies be better able to compete for the available resources of inter-
mediaries. It is also a promising strategy for strengthening the chances 
of experienced, mission-driven organizations threatened by new con-
tracting arrangements.
These kinds of innovations—formed through collaborative and 
creative partnerships, assisted by private fundraising and changes in 
status (the development of a for-profit subsidiary)—represent healthy 
and promising adaptations. But, again, these are the exceptions. Most 
smaller nonprofits are having a hard time of it, and squeezing profit 
margins will retard creativity and productivity among even the most 
competent providers. Worse, such pressures will threaten the organiza-
tional mission and human service values that make nonprofit providers 
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uniquely qualified to undertake some of the most difficult and important 
services now being outsourced. And those are the risks that attend the 
survivors. Others may simply disappear. As organizations learn to adapt 
to new funding, service, and management imperatives, so too must local 
governments adapt their program designs. Contracting is popular, but 
it is hard to do well, especially for providing human services. Public, 
nonprofit, and private providers have different comparative advantages. 
Evaluating the relative risks and rewards of various arrangements and 
choosing carefully requires experience and an interest in analyzing the 
impacts of alternative designs.
The dilemma involved in the design of New York City’s perfor-
mance-based contract is instructive since within it reside the incentive 
structures that affect the behavior of contractors. Paying too much for 
initial job placements and too little for job retention (in quality jobs 
with good pay and benefits) encourages contractors to provide little ser-
vice or effort to find good jobs. But placing too much of the payment 
on the back end may impede cash flow and cripple contractors’ ability 
to stay afloat. Thus, contract design needs to balance optimizing cash 
flow to contractors with setting milestones at the desired levels. It’s a 
balancing act among three desires: to reduce program costs, to improve 
service quality, and to insure the fiscal stability of the contracting or-
ganizations. This is more art than science. But if employment training 
is to achieve its promise in a resource constrained environment, it will 
require more than the adaptation of nonprofit providers to demands for 
efficiency. Local government must do a better job of learning, through 
multiple iterations of contract design, to identify the right balance of 
incentives and supports. Only in this way can it preserve the viability 
of mission-driven and innovative nonprofits and allow them to compete 
without losing their souls.
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